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IS INSOLVENCY ALONE SUFFICIENT TO GIVE
EQUITY JURISDICTION?*
KENNITH

A.

Ho'wnt

As indicated by the historical development of the court of
chancery,1 the general principle is that equity has jurisdiction
where an adequate remedy cannot be obtained in the common
law courts. The rule is generally stated in the negative form
that equity will not entertain jurisdiction where there is an
adequate remedy unless it is shown that there is some feature
peculiarly within the province of a court of equity, or unless
jurisdiction has been conferred by statute. 2 It is well settled
that the existence of a remedy at law does not deprive equity of
jurisdiction unless such remedy is adequate. 3 However there is
no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes adequacy. Various
text-writers 4 and courts have formulated two tests to determine
the adequacy of the legal remedy. On the one hand it has been
held that if the plaintiff can obtain a valid judgment by a proceeding at law the legal remedy is adequate, 5 that "the want
of a remedy is entirely distinct from the inability to obtain the
fruits of a remedy, and where there is a complete remedy at law
the fact that there is difficulty in its execution will not authorize
the courts of equity to grant relief.' ' On the other hand it
has been held that the remedy at law is not adequate unless the
plaintiff can obtain pecuniary compensation which will place
1 LL. B., University of Kentucky, 1933; Attorney at Law, Lexington, Ky.
* The following authorities will aid in a study of this problem:
Horack: Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 Har. L. Rev. 702
(1918); Lawrence on Equity, Vol. I, Secs. 77, 78, 79, 265, Vol. II, See. 879
(1929); Wa7sh on Equity, Secs. 26, 29, 30, 63 (1930); Clark on Equity,
Sees. 45, 46, 194, 195, 196, 201, 202 (1919); Remington on Bankruptcy,
Sees. 13, 16 (2d ed. 1915); 14 R. C. L. 145; 32 A. L. R. 464.
'1 Lawrence on Equity, Chap. 3 (1929); Walsh on Equity, Chaps.
1, 2 (1930); Equity, 21 Corpus Juris, Sec. 2.
'Equity, 21 Corpus Juris, Sec. 14, and cases cited in notes 15, 16,
17, 18, 19.
3Equity, 21 Corpus Juris, Sec. 27, note 31.
'Lawrence on Equity, Vol. I, Sec. 79 (1929).
Lassar v. Baldridge, 32 Mo. App. 362 (1888); Gillett v. Warren, 10
N. M. 523, 62 Pac. 975 (1900); Tampa, G. C. R. Co. v. Mulhern, 73 Fla.
146, 74 So. 297 (1917).
8
Thompson v. Allen Co., 115 U. S. 550, 29 L. Ed. 472 (1885).
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had been performed
him in the same situation as if the contract
7
or the tort had not been committed.
This latter test seems to be more in harmony with general
8
equity principles, and if the defendant is insolvent it seems to
follow that there cannot be an adequate remedy at law. In such
a case it logically follows that equity should take jurisdiction.
In spite of this fact the majority of the courts have refused to
take jurisdiction on the ground of insolvency alone, although
9
most of them have considered it a make-weight argument.
It is the purpose of th.e writer to examine some of the cases
and formulate a definite conclusion as to whether insolvency
alone should be sufficient, and to find if there is a respectable
number of cases to support it.
The cases naturally fall into two grand divisions: tort and
contract. The conclusion reached in each division must depend
upon whether there is an adequate remedy at law, in fact, when
the defendant is insolvent.

I.

TORTS.
Waste.
Absolute ownership over property gives absolute control
and dominion over it including the right to permanently change
it, subject only to the limitation imposed on all that the owner
shall not maintain a nuisance on his land. In the case of tenants of all kinds (except tenants at will), whose ownership is
limited, a further limitation is imposed: that they shall not
commit waste. Waste has been variously defined as: (1) the
destruction or alteration of any part of the tenement by a tenant
to the injury of the person entitled to inheritance ;1o (2) as an
unlawful act or omission of duty on the part of the tenant which
results in injury to the inheritance;11 and (3) as an unreasonable and improper use and abuse, or omission of duty touching
the real estate by the one rightfully in possession, which results
12
in substantial injury thereto.
A.

IParker v. Garrison, 61 Ill. 250 (1871); Draper v. Stone, 71 Me.
175 (1880); Lyman v. Suburban R. Co., 190 Ill. 320, 60 N. E. 515 (1901).
8 See 32 Corpus Juris, 305-811, for a discussion of the various meanings of insolvency. Insolvency in this connection should be taken to
mean only the inability to satisfy a judgment should one be rendered
against the defendant.
9 Walsh on Equity, Sec. 63 (1930).
, Davenport v. Magoon, 13 Ore. 3, 4 Pac. 299 (1884).
"1Cherokee Const. Co. v. Harris, 92 Ark. 260, 122 S. W. 485 (1909).
,'Moore v. Twin City Ice Co., 92 Wash. 608, 159 Pac. 779 (1916).
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Chancery for the first time intervened to prevent waste by
an injunction in the fifteenth century. 13 The Chancellor, h.owever, probably acted in these cases because of the lack of a
remedy at law, and not because of the inadequacy of damages
14
as a remedy. We flnd that, until the case of Hornerv. Popham,
equity intervened only in the absence of any remedy whatsoever,
and not because of the inadequacy of any remedy that existed.
But since that time the jurisdiction of equity to grant specific
relief by means of an injunction against waste has become well
established in both England and the United States. The reason
is plain, as waste is a wrong which cannot be adequately compensated in damages, as all realty is unique, and as it should be
met at its earliest approaches by a decisive preventive remedy
which is prompt and yet affords the party restrained a speedy
hearing.
It seems that the granting of an injunction to stay waste
has become almost a matter of course whether the damages
threatened or being done are committed by one who is solvent
or insolvent. It is within the scope of this article to examine
some of the waste cases, and to determine whether the insolvency
of the defendant has had any influence upon the courts in granting injunctive relief.
1. Where the injunction is sought to prevent the continuance
of waste.
In the case of Woolworth v. Nelson,"'5 the lessor filed a bill
for an injunction to restrain the lessee and sub-lessee from cutting doors through a party wall. The defendants offered evidence tending to show that the building could be restored to its
original condition, and offered to give bond for such restoration
at the end of the term. However, the court granted the injunction on the ground that the proposed alteration amounted to
waste, and that the landlord was entitled to relief regardless of
the irreparability of the injury or the solvency or insolvency
of the defendant.
This decision seems to be in conflict with the general equity
principle that a wrong will be enjoined only when the legal
remedy is inadequate. The reason for granting relief seems to
3
Walsh on Equity, 135 (1930).
11Colles 1, 1 Eng. Rep. 150 (1697) ; Walsh on Equity, 136 (1930).
'5204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449 (1920).
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have been the landlord's right to have the premises remain in
the condition in which they were leased.
In Stephenson v. National Bank of Winter Haven 6 the tenants had begun the construction of partitions on tlhe interior of
the building, which they had leased from the plaintiff, for the
purpose of converting the building into an "arcade building".
An injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from making any further change, the court stating that the insolvency of
the defendant or the irreparability of the injury was im17
material.
That the mortgagee may maintain a suit in equity to stay
waste of the mortgaged premises seems to be the rule in all jurisdictions in which the problem has arisen, but there is some slight
conflict as to the degree of the injury which is necessary in order
that the aid of a court of equity may be invoked. By far the
greater weight of authority limits the right of a mortgagee to
maintain a suit to stay waste to cases where the mortgage debt
is impaired, or there is danger of the property becoming an
insufficient security for the mortgage. s
In some of the cases the insolvency of the mortgagor was
stated to be or evidently was the decisive factor which induced
the court to grant an injunction. In Robinson v. Russell,19 an
injunction was refused to stay waste by an execution creditor
whom the mortgagor had authorized to remove some nursery
trees, on the ground that it was not stated or shown that the
mortgagor was insolvent or was unable to respond in damages
for the threatened injury. In Bunker v. Locke 20 it was held
that an insolvent mortgagor would be restrained from cutting
timber from the mortgaged premises where the mortgage security would be rendered inadequate. In Bank of Chenango v.
Fox21 it was held that the insolvency of a person against whom
relief was sought for waste would be sufficient ground for an
injunction at the instance of the mortgagee to prevent the re-

M92 Fla. 347, 109 So. 424 (1926).
"7See also Burton v. Steverson, 206 Ala. 508, 91 So. 74 (1921);
Harris v. Bannon, 78 Ky. 568 (1880); Hastings v. Perry, 20 Vt. 272
(1848).
Is Coker v. Whitlock, 54 Ala. 180 (1875).
"24 Cal. 467 (1864).
15 WIs. 702 (1862).
=26 N. J. Eq. 452 (1875).
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moval of timber cut upon the mortgaged premises, and the in22
junction -was refused because insolvency was not alleged.
In other cases, however, the insolvency of the mortgagor
was either stated to be an immaterial factor, or was not mentioned by the court in its opinion when discussing the grounds
2
upon which the relief was granted.
Therefore, as a conclusion, we can say that in cases where
waste has begun and an injunction is being sought to restrain
the further commission, insolvency plays no part, except in cases
where the mortgagee seeks to restrain the mortgagor from
committing waste, and these decisions occur in only a few jurisdictions where the problem has arisen.
2.

Threatened waste.
It seems to be well settled that an injunction will be granted
to prevent threatened waste regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the defendant. In Brigham v. Overstreet2 4 the tenant
theatened to remove some fixtures which he had placed on the
land, and also some manure produced in the course of good
husbandry. The court granted the injunction, stating, "..
But injunction to stay waste or prevent waste has been held
proper, regardless of the question as to whether the damages
threatened would be irreparable, and without reference to the
solvency or insolvency of the party sought to be enjoined." In
Palmer v. Young 25 the lessees were enjoined from removing
certain fixtures (plate glass, radiators, and elevators) which they
had placed in the building on the ground that the insolvency
of the threatening party need not be shown. In Triplett v.
6
ParmaZeeU
it was also held that a mortgagee could maintain a
suit for an injunction against the mortgagor and a stranger who
threatened to commit waste without regard to their solvency or
27
insolveney.
3.

Trespass in the nature of waste.
Acts of a trespasser, without title, causing damage, which

2Lavenson v. Standard Soap Co., 80 Cal. 245, 22 Pac. 184 (1889).
2'Terry v. Robbins, 122 Fed. 725 (1903); Williams v. Chicago Ex.
Co., 188 Ill. 19, 58 N. E. 611 (1900); Beaver Flume Lumber Co. v.
Eccles, 43 Ore. 400, 73 Pac. 201 (1903).
24128 Ga. 264, 57 S. E. 484 (1907).
2108 Ill. App. 252 (1904).

16 Neb. 649, 21 N. W. 403 (1884).
See also Tidwell v. H. H. Hitt Lumber Co., 198 Ala. 236, 73 So.
486 (1916).
2
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if done by a tenant would be waste, will be enjoined by equity
in a few jurisdictions because damages would be inadequate just
as damages are inadequate for similar acts by tenants in case
of Waste. 28 Thus, we have the following statement in an early
29
federal case:
"The technical distinction between waste and trespass has long

been disregarded by courts of equity, and the rule now is that wherever
trespass is accompanied by irreparable injury, or a multiplicity of
suits, an injunction will be allowed as in a case of waste."

These cases seem to be disregarding the insolvency of the defendant in discussing the grounds upon which relief is granted.
In Merced Mining Co. v. Freemont30 the plaintiff owned a
mining claim, and the defendants entered and removed some
quartz avowing their intention to continue. The court held that
in cases of mines and timber, the statement of the injury was
sufficient; that the taking of the minerals is in itself an injury
which is irreparable; and that an allegation of insolvency is not
necessary in these cases because the right to an injunction is
based upon the injury and not upon the party's ability to respond in damages.
In the case of Richards v. Dower31 we find the court still
enunciating the same doctrine. The defendant in that case excavated a tunnel under the plaintiff's lot, but it was not shown
that it would affect the surface of the plaintiff's land. The
court granted the injunction quoting from Moore v. Massini:32
"The gravaman is a threatened trespass upon the land. The
trespass is in the nature of waste, and it will be committed unless the
defendant is restrained. Should the threat be fulfilled the plaintiff
would be deprived of a part of the substance of the inheritance which
2 Shipley v. Ritter, 7 Mo. 408 (1855). The following statement in
this case is clearly evidence of the advanced state of the law in some
jurisdictions at an early date: "We consider it the settled law of this
state that although an injunction will not be granted to restrain a
trespasser merely because he is a trespasser, yet equity will interfere
where the injury is irreparable or where an adequate relief cannot be
granted at law or where the trespasser goes to the destruction of the
property as it had been held and enjoyed, or where it is necessary to
prevent a multiplicity of suits."
Chapman v. Toy Long, 4 Sawy. 28, Fed. Cas. No. 2610 (1876).
7 Cal. 317 (1857).
64 Cal. 62, 28 Pac. 113 (1865).
'32 Cal. 590 (1867).

K. L. J.-4
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could not be specifically replaced. In the class to which this case belongs no allegation of insolvency is necessary.2'u

4. Where waste consists of the severance of chattels.
Where the waste consists of the severance of chattels, and
the insolvent tenant threatens to carry them away, the question
arises as to whether there is an adequate remedy at law if he is
allowed to do so. The common law action of trover would not
be an adequate remedy, because he is insolvent, and it is doubtful whether replevin would be as he is rightly in possession.
But the common law action of detinue appears to be the proper
remedy.34 Under the codes there is undoubtedly an adequate
remedy in such a case. 5 Thus, in those cases in which insolvency was present, it seems to have been a very material element, but in only two does it appear that insolvency alone was
sufficient.
In American Trust Co. v. North BelleviTle Quarry Co.36 the
mortgagor quarried some stone from the mortgaged premises
and threatened to remove it. The court granted the injunction
to restrain the threatened removal, and it seems that insolvency
was the only basis.
In Spear v. Cutter3 7 the complainant asked for an injunction to restrain the removal of timber already cut, and also to
restrain the future commission of waste. The insolvency of the
defendant was proven. The court granted the injunction, stating that: "... as the defendant is insolvent, the injury to the
plaintiff will be irreparable, if the defendant is allowed to remove or dispose of the timber already cut." It seems that the
insolvency of the defendant was the only ground upon which
the injunction was granted. Although there was an allegation
of waste, this element cannot be linked with the insolvency as
a ground for the injunction as to the removal of the timber
already cut. Had there not been an element of insolvency the
court would have undoubtedly granted the injunction merely to
restrain the future commission of waste, and would have refused
it to prevent the removal of the severed timber.
'3To the same effect see Walsh on Equity 151, note 17 (1930) and
cases there cited; Bettes v. Brower, 184 Fed. 342 (1911); Pardee v.
Camden Lumber Co., 70 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911); Kock v. Story,
47 Colo. 335, 107 Pac. 1093 (1910).
1, Shipman's Common Law Pleading 114, 118, 120 (3rd ed. 1923).
Kentucky Civil Code, Sees. 181, 388.
331 N. J. Eq. 89 (1879).
315 Barb. 486 (N. Y. 1849).
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In Kistler v. Weaver 3s it was held that an injunction would
not be granted to prevent the removal of timber already cut,
unless the defendant was insolvent, for if the defendant was
solvent the plaintiff can obtain an equivalent in money in an
action at law. This case while not emphatically stating that
insolvency alone is sufficient, presents a very strong argument
for the adherents of that view.
But in Watson v. Hunter,"9 the court refused to grant an
injunction upon the ground of insolvency alone. The court
stated that insolvency is a danger applicable to all other cases
of ordinary damages; and it is not such a case of special mischief as will justify this extraordinary preventive remedy.
B.

TRESPASS.

1.

Mere trespass.
A distinction formerly existed between cases which were
formerly in trespass and cases of waste. Originally, a court of
equity, though it would act to prevent waste would not act to
prevent trespass. The jurisdiction to grant such relief in the
latter class of cases is of comparatively recent origin as a result
of a reluctant, but nevertheless, gradual recognition by the judiciaries of the necessities of the exercise of such power to prevent irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remdy at
40
law.
It is now the general rule that equity will not restrain by an
injunction the commission of a mere or ordinary trespass. The
nature of the trespass or the injury resulting therefrom must
be such as to require equitable interference on the theory that
the plaintiff will be left to his legal remedy, unless some element
texsts such as irreparable injury or other conditions which
renders the courts of law inadequate. The presence of some one
or more of these factors is essential, and in their absence the
common law remedy is adequate and perfectly competent to
give compensation as well as to deter and prevent the repetition
of the trespass by the damages which it will inflict.
Regardless of the fact that when the defendant is insolvent
there can be no true remedy at law, it seems to be the general
rule that the insolvency of the defendant alone cannot give
S135 N. C. 388, 47 S. E. 478 (1904).
5 Johns. Ch. 169 (N. Y. 1821).
*'14 R. C. L. 145; 32 A. L. R. 464.
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equity power to grant an injunction in the absence of other
circumstances justifying equitable interference. Thus, in Hume
v. Burns41 the court stated that the general doctrine was that
a court of equity will not grant an injunction to restrain a mere
trespass where the injury complained of is not irreparable and
destructive of the plaintiff's estate, and that if it is susceptible
of pecuniary compensation, and he may obtain adequate satisfaction in the course of law, the insolvency of the defendant is
no ground of relief in equity in a suit of this character. It was
also held in Warlier v. Williams 42 that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction to remove from his real estate one who
had without title unlawfully entered and wrongfully remained
thereon, although such trespasser be insolvent.
However, in other jurisdictions insolvency seems to be an
important jurisdictional basis, although it has never been held
sufficient in itself. In Hanley v. Waterson43 the court held that
an injunction would be granted to enjoin a mere trespass where
it is alleged in the bill that the defendant is insolvent, because
in such a case the remedy at law is inadequate. In Hall v. Henninger44 it was held that an injunction to prevent a mere trespass on land would not be granted in the absence of some distinct ground of equitable interference, such as the insolvency
of the defendant or irreparable injury. In West v. Walker45 it
is said that the court will interfere to prevent a mere trespass,
where from the irresponsibility of the defendant or otherwise
the complainant could not obtain an adequate relief at law, citing
two cases 46 which upon examination are believed to sustain this
47
statement.
2.

Repeated
Although
injunction to
comparatively

and continuing trespasses.
the interference of courts of equity by way of
prevent repeated or continuing trespasses is of
recent origin, the law is now well settled that an

"50 Ore. 124, 90 Pac. 1009 (1907).
'53
Neb. 143, 73 N. W. 539 (1897); see also Parker v. Furlong,
37 Ore. 248, 62 Pac. 490 (1900).
39 W. Va. 214, 19 S. E. 536 (1894).
145 Iowa 230, 121 N. W. 6 (1909).
43

N. J. Eq. 290 and Note B at 290 (1871).

"Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 3 Paige 212 (N. Y. 1832); Smallman v.
Onions, 3 Bro. Ch. Rep. 621, 29 Eng. Rep. 733 (1792).
"See also Sanders v. Boone, 154 Ark. 237, 242 S. W. 66 (1922);
Leech v. Harbough, 3 Neb. (unof.) 346, 91 N. W. 521 (1902).
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injunction will lie to restrain acts of trespass which are continuous or constantly re-occuring where irreparable injury will
result, and the court will award the relief that the nature of the
action demands. It is clear that when the defendant is insolvent there can be no adequate remedy at law, nor generally when
he is solvent, because there is a multiplicity of suits involved.
Several cases, however, have been cited as sustaining the
view that insolvency alone is sufficient. But, upon examination
it is found that they do not sustain this contention. In Wi7son
V. Hij48 where the defendants placed their fishing nets upon the
plaintiff's land, the court granted the injunction, stating that
it was the irresponsibility of the defendants which made the remedy at law valueless and inadequate. This case seems to be good
authority for the proposition that repeated trespasses without
more is not sufficient, but it is not authority for the proposition
that insolvency alone is sufficient to give equity jurisdiction.
Were it not for the irresponsibility of the defendants it is
doubtful whether the court would have granted the injunction,
but the case does not definitely state that insolvency alone is
sufficient because we have repeated trespasses causing a multiplicity of suits. In Tharpe v. ,Severling 9 the court again did
not grant the injunction on the ground of insolvency alone, but
upon the grounds of insolvency, speculative damages, and continuing trespasses. It does not seem that insolvency was by any
means a major element. 50
It seems that in about twenty states cases have been decided
in which it has been held that the solvency or insolvency of the
trespasser may be an important factor in determining whether
an injunction should be granted to restrain the repeated or
continuing trespassers. 51 In Carney v. Hadley52 it was held
that in the case of repeated or continuing trespasses upon timber rights insolvency alone may not be sufficient, yet it is an important element in determining whether or not a court of equity
should act in granting an injunction. In Miller v. Wi//s 53 it was
held that although mere insolvency is not generally decisive of
the right to grant an injunction, it constitutes in particular cases
4146 N. J. Eq. 367, 19 Atl. 1097 (1890).
1128 Kan. 235, 276 Pac. 821 (1929).
"' See also Woodstock v. Quinn, 201 Ala. 631, 79 So. 253 (1918).
6132 A. L. R. 495 and cases there cited.
1232 Fla. 344, 14 So. 4 (1893).
95 Va. 337, 28 S. E. 337 (1897).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

an important element in determining whether a court should
award it, for the trespasser being insolvent, a legal remedy,
though theoretically adequate, would be practically fruitless.
In Webster v. Cooke54 it Was held that in a petition alleging insolvency an additional ground was shown. 55
It also seems well settled that solvency will not defeat the
equitable right to an injunction, but that an injunction may be
an appropriate remedy notwithstanding the trespasser's solvency on the grounds of irreparable injury or the avoidance of
a multiplicity of suits. 56
In many decisions, however, it has been held that insolvency
alone is not sufficient to give equity jurisdiction. Thus, in
Centreville & A. Turnpike Co. v. Barnett5 7 an injunction was
sought to enjoin the Turnpike Co. from continuing the grading
of a road because of the improper manner in which the work
was being performed. It was held that insolvency was not sufficient to warrant relief by an injunction in the absence of other
circumstances warranting such relief such as irreparable injury,
or the inadequacy of the legal remedy.58
INSOLvENCY ALONE Is SUFFICIENT.
It seems that there is a small class of cases in which it is
held that insolvency alone is sufficient to give equity jurisdiction.
When there is a case of threatened, repeated or continuing trespasses over a short period of time, the plaintiff can, under the
modern Codes permitting a joinder of causes of action, wait until
that time has elapsed, and then sue in a law court and get an
adequate remedy. 59 But if the defendant is insolvent the remedy
at law is in fact inadequate, and if equity grants an injunction,
it seems to follow that it would be granted on the ground of
insolvency alone.
C.

r423 Kan. 637 (1880).
15See also Raleigh v. Glendon Mfg. Co., 112 N. C. 667, 17 S. E. 77
(1893).
5Keil v. Wright, 135 Iowa 383, 112 N. W. 633 (1907); Graham v.
Wonack, 82 Mo. App. 618 (1900).
- 2 Ind. 536 (1851).
5 See also Watson v. Holmes, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 515 (1883); Musselman v. Marquis, 1 Bush 463 (Ky. 1866); Caney v. Hadley, 32 Fla. 344,
14 So. 4 (1893).
rl Gulf Compress Co. v. Harris Courtner Co., 158 Ala. 343, 48 So.
477 (1908).
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Thus, in Paige v. Atkin, 60 where the defendant was a tenant
on the plaintiff's land, and was retained to cultivate the land
after the expiration of his term, an injunction was granted to
restrain the removal of a crop of wheat. The insolvency of the
defendant was the only ground upon which the injunction was
granted, and the court went so far as to say that absolute and
complete insolvency need not be shown. It seems that the plaintiff in this case could have waited until the entire crop had been
removed, and then he would have had an adequate remedy at
laW, notwithstanding the technical right to sue every day. (But
if he sued every day he would be bringing upon himself a multiplicity of suits.) If he were insolvent there could be no adequate remedy at law, and the injunction was undoubtedly granted on the ground of insolvency alone. In West v. Smithl6 the
defendants entered and begun harvesting the plaintiff's wheat.
The court granted an injunction to restrain the defendants on
the ground of insolvency alone. The same line of reasoning applies to this case as to the one above. 62
In Sooy Oyster Co. v. Gaskill, 3 which is a case similar in
facts to the above case, the same logical reasoning applies. However, the argument has been advanced that the fact there were
many (fifty) defendants furnished two grounds upon which the
decision was based. This argument seems untenable, because
under the modern Codes there may be a joinder of defenants
in such a case.

D.

AsPORTATION OF CHATTELS.

Where one has trespassed upon the land of another and
wrongfully taken unique chattels, or threatens to do so, equity
will give specific reparation for the tortious detention or restrain the removal, regardless of the solvency or insolvency of
the defendant. 64 The relief at law in such a case is inadequate,
because damages are insufficient due to the unique character of
the goods. A court of equity, being able to command the defendant to produce the chattels,05 or restrain the threatened
&'112Cal. 401, 44 Pac. 666 (1896).
52 Cal. 322 (1877).
Also Hicks v. Compton, 18 Cal. 206 (1861).
69 Atl. 1084 (N. J. 1908).
"Clark: Principlesof Equity, 53 (1919).

SAmes': Cases on Equity, 532 note 3, and cases there cited (1927).

K
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removal by an injunction can thus deal with the situation more
effectively than a law court.
Where the chattels taken or threatened to be taken are nonunique, the plaintiff may bring an action of trover or trespass
at law, or the modern actions similar to the above forms of
action. In either case he will ordinarily get a judgment for the
value of the chattel. If the plaintiff wishes to get back the chattel in specie he may do so either by detinue or by the modern
statutory replevin.
Equity has generally refused to grant relief in the case of
non-unique chattels because the remedy at law is adequate. 6 It
seems, however, that the remedy at law may be rendered inadequate if the defendant is insolvent, and in such a case equity
should take jurisdiction. Upon an examination of the cases it
will be found that equity has in only a few instances given
relief on the ground of insolvency alone.
In Rohrer v. Babcock 67 the defendant trespassed upon the
plaintiff's land and commenced removing hay to feed his cattle.
The plaintiff filed a bill for an injunction alleging the insolvency
of the defendant. The court granted the injunction stating that
the plaintiff could not have maintained an action in the nature
of replevin, because the hay would have been consumed before
writs for its redelivery could have been obtained and served.
The only available remedy at law was trover and the court stated
that this would be abortive because the defendant was insolvent.
As it was the insolvency of the defendant alone which rendered
the remedy at law inadequate, it naturally follows that insolvency was the only ground upon which the court took jurisdiction.
I
In Bristol v. Halyburton68 it was held that a court of equity
-would not interfere by an injunction to stay an execution regularly issued on a judgment at law because the sheriff had levied
on property not subject to sale under execution, or because the
property belonged to another, except where the property levied
upon was personal property, and the sheriff and the plaintiff
-were both insolvent. In Kaufman v. Weiner 9 it was held that
the allegation of insolvency was in no sense material to the parClark: op. cit., supra, note 64 at 259.
114 Cal. 124, 45 Pac. 1054 (1896).
93 N. C. 384 (1885).
169 Ill. 596, 48 N. E. 479 (1897).
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ties upon right and justice, but only important because, if the
defendant was solvent, a court of law would have been the
proper forum.70
Other cases have been decided in which insolvency has
been considered, but, in none of these, has it been emphatically
stated that insolvency, in the absence of other equitable grounds,
would have been sufficient. In Milan v. Hickey l where the
defendants opened a log boom and took a number of the plaintiff's logs, an injunction was granted upon the grounds of insolvency and the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. In Lewis
72
the tenants, at the expiration of the terms of the
v. Christian
contract, threatened to carry away their share of the crops. The
plaintiffs filed a bill for an injunction to restrain them until
the damages which she had suffered because of their bad management could be ascertained and decreed. It was alleged in the
bill that the defendants were insolvent. The court granted the
injunction stating that the insolvency of the defendant made
the remedy at law less efficient.
II.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS

There is also much conflict in the decisions and among text
writers as to whether insolvency alone is sufficient to give equity
jurisdiction to grant the specific preformance of a contract. It
can hardly be said that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at
law for the damages which he has suffered when the remedy
thus provided will yield him no actual returns. It is clear that,
when the plaintiff has contracted for unique subject matter, and
has advanced the purchase price, equity has jurisdiction and
may grant relief regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the
defendant. 73 The very character of the goods makes it impossible to replace them with any sum of money, and it seems to be
equally clear that, when he has contracted for non-unique subject matter, and the defendant is insolvent, his remedy at law
is just as inadequate, no matter how accurate the ascertainment
0f the damages may have been. His remedy is not inadequate
because he needs the particular goods, but because he cannot
with the money recoverable from the seller buy such goods in
,luality and amount as the contract calls for.
See also Hitt v. Ehrlich, 89 Ga. 824, 15 S. E. 770 (1892).
Ga. 187 (1867).
"Clark: op. cit., supra, note 64, Sees. 45-46; 36 Cyc. 557.
59 N. H. 241 (1821).

1240

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

Nevertheless, in only a few instances, has insolvency alone
been held sufficient. Many courts express considerable doubt
as to whether the defendant's inability to respond to a judgment against him is sufficient grounds upon which equity may
take jurisdiction, though it is generally conceded to have a very
material bearing upon the question of granting or refusing
relief.
In the case of Clark v. Fljt, 74 which has often been cited
as sustaining the view that insolvency alone is a basis for equity
jurisdiction, it is found that there are other elements present,
and that the court did not have to decide the case upon that
ground alone. There were elements of trust relationship, unique
property (historically, boats were considered unique property,
but that argument has probably been done away with today),
and an accounting for profits. In the case of Texas v. Central
Fuel Oil Co.,75 which has also been cited as sustaining the above
mentioned proposition, there were other equitable grounds, such
as multiplicity of suits, difficulty of the ascertainment of damages, and monopoly of the source. In Bai v. Sidlbzberg76 an injunction was granted on the grounds of insolvency and the impossibility of the ascertainment of damages due to the unknown
value of the stock. In Hogg v. McGuffijn.77 the court granted a
decree of specific performance of a contract for the exchange of
shares of stock. It seems that the grounds of the decision were the
peculiar value of the stock, insolvency, and the impossibility of
the ascertainment of damages. In McNainara v. Hornelard Cattle Co3 8 the complainant sued for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of cattle, alleging that the defendant was
insolvent. The court granted the decree, and it has been stated
that insolvency was the only basis of the decision. But upon
a close examination of the facts, there seems to be an element of
fraud present; nevertheless it is a very strong case for those
9
who maintain that insolvency alone should be sufficient7
It seems that in a few jurisdictions where the problem has
arisen the courts have refused to grant a decree of specific performance upon a mere allegation of insolvency. In Warren v.
Pick. 232 (Mass. 1839).
5194 Fed. 1 (1912).
53 Misc. 386, 104 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1907).
67 W. Va. 456, 68 S. E. 41 (1910).
s 105 Fed. 203 (1900).
0 See also Doty v. Doty, 171 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1918).
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Black Coal Co.80 a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of coal was refused on the ground that insolvency alone was insufficient to give equity jurisdiction. In
Gillett v. Warrens ' it was held that the insolvency of the vendor
standing alone would not authorize specific enforcement of a
contract, the bill not furnishing other grounds as a basis of
equitable jurisdiction. In Cincinnati,etc., B. Co. v. WashburnS2
specific performance of an agreement of an insolvent railroad
company to fence its right of way and to deliver freight bonds
was refused. And in Hendey v. lWhidden, 83 where the defendant was execution proof and insolvent, the court refused to decree specific performance of an agreement to deliver a certain
number of cattle at a specified price per head.8 1
Though generally courts have refused to grant specific performance of a contract on the ground of insolvency alone, a few
have held that it alone was sufficient. In Dilburne v. Youngbloods" the court refused a decree of specific preformance to
transfer a note and chattel mortgage, stating:
"Ordinarily a court of equity will not decree specific performance
of a contract in reference to personal property unless it clearly appears
that on account of the nature of the contract a court of law is incapable of affording a full and adequate remedy for a breach of the subject matter. Insolvency will render the court of law incapable of
affording a full and adequate compensation, but as it is not alleged
in this case the plaintiff must fail."

In Parker v. Gar'isons0 an agreement to deliver one-half
of the corn raised upon land was enforced against an insolvent
7
tenant who attempted to remove the same. In Ames v. Witbeck8
specific performance of a contract for the transfer of stocks and
bonds was decreed. In Chastain v. Srmit O8 the performance
of a parole contract which was not within the Statute of Frauds
was granted. The court held that, ". . . whenever the parties
cannot be restored to their status quo, nor adequately compen8'S5W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
10 N. BM.523, 62 Pac. 975 (1900).
' 25 Ind. 259 (1865).
1-148 Fla. 268, 37 So. 571 (1904).
"'See also Livesly v. Johnston, 45 Ore. 30, 76 Pac. 13 (1904);
Ridenbaugh v. Thayer, 10 Idaho 662, 80 Pac. 229 (1905); Heilman v.
Union Canel Co., 37 Pa. St. 100 (1860).
85 Ala. 449, 5 So. 175 (1888).
'61 Ill. 250 (1S71).
S179 Ill. 458, 53 N. E. 969 (1899).
E330 Ga. 96 (1860).
'
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sated in damages by turning them over to their action in a court
of law it would be fraud to refuse it" (specific performance),89
The most plausible argument that has been urged against
the specific preformance of a contract during the defendant's
insolvency is its violation of the spirit of our bankruptcy legislation.90 In a few situations equity refuses to exercise its power,
because specific performance should not be granted one creditor
in his suit against an insolvent defendant, when such relief
would result to the prejudice of other creditors. 91 For instance,
if one, who contracts to sell ordinary chattel property, becomes
bankrupt, the property is the assets of the estate, and, if the
bankrupt has been paid in advance before the bankruptcy, and
has subsequently delivered the goods within four months prior
to the filing of the petition, he would have given a preference.
Therefore, where there are many creditors who are in practically
the same situation, specific preformance is obviously impossible
since all of them cannot be paid, and specific performance would
be a violation of the above mentioned legislation. ". . . such
relief is also opposed to the fundamental principles upon which
equity courts act in all other situations, where its relief is depending upon the question of whether it can be granted without
92
doing harm to third persons."
However, in case of a bona fide contract made by the insolvent, even up to the very date of filing the bankruptcy petition, which is wholly executory on both sides, and made in good
faith, it is not a preference for a court of equity to grant specific performance of the contract; but, if the insolvent, prior
to the performance on his part, has already received the whole
or part of the consideration for his own promised performance
so that a debt or obligation is due from him, the situation is
different, and to grant specific performance in this case would
8 See also Brett v. Warneek, 44 Ore. 511, 75 Pac. 1061 (1904);
Williams v. Carpenter, 14 Colo. 471, 24 Pac. 558 (1890); Glassbrenner
v. Groulik, 110 Wis. 402, 85 N. W. 962 (1901).
0 ". . . The American statute seeks to prevent any transfer by insolvent debtors on account of pre-existing obligations, by making it an
act of bankruptcy, and, if the bankruptcy supervenes within four
months, making the transaction voidable, if the creditors had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be effected. The motive
of the debtor is immaterial." 1 Williston on Sales, Sec. 145, note 67
(2d ed. 1924).
Chaffee v. Sprague, 16 R. I. 189, 13 Atl. 121 (1888); Munger v.
Albany, etc., Bank, 85 N. Y. 580 (1881).
0231 liar. L. Rev. 702, 706 (1918).
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be a preference. 93 In any case it must always appear that the
title to the goods purchased has passed, or that an equitable lien
exists, or that the money paid in advance is to be kept as a distinct fund to become the bankrupt's only on the delivery of the
goods; otherwise he is really a creditor. 94
It may also happen that the complainant is the only creditor
of the insolvent so that no third person can be injured by granting specific preformance. Again it may happen that, even
though there are other creditors, the situation may be such that
no question involving the settlement and distribution of the
debtor's assets is raised. The debtor may belong to a class of
those who cannot be forced into involuntary bankruptcy, and
he may pay such debts as he wishes, and his other creditors
cannot object to his so doing; and, if he is compelled to perform his obligation to the complainant, his other creditors are
not injured any more than if he made such payment voluntarily. The conclusion to which we must come in our study of this
section is that a judgment at law, for damages, against an insolvent defendant, for a breach of a contract, is obviously inadequate, and that there is no reason why equity cannot grant
specific preformance when the interest of no third party will
be thereby injured.9 5
CONCLUSION

It is therefore submitted, in conclusion, that the instances
in which insolvency has been held sufficient are very rare. The
courts are far from being in harmony as to the significance of
insolvency as a jurisdictional basis; many holding that it is very
material, others holding that it is immaterial. However, these
decisions are sufficient to show the glaring insufficiency of a
mere worthless judgment at law, which no one, if he will disregard the technical rule, can conscientiously say is adequate.
These cases should be recognized by the courts as the precedent
I 1 Williston, op. cit., supra, note 90, Sec. 144.
91Remmington on Bankruptcy, See. 1316 (2d ed. 1915).
El
forack: Insolvency and Specific Performance, 31 Har. L. Rev.
702, 719, note 45 (1918): "In cases involving the Statute of Frauds
the refusal of equity to grant specific performance has no bearing on
the question of insolvency as a basis of jurisdiction, for, whether the
legal remedy is inadequate because of the character of the property
or the financial condition of the defendant, the proposition before the
court is the observance and enforcement of the provisions of the
statute rather than any question of the adequacy or inadequacy of the
legal remedy."
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of a new doctrine which will meet the demands of a modern
civilization. Judges should disregard all decisions to the contrary, and in the furtherance of general equitable principles,
grant equitable relief against an insolvent defendant.
It may be boldly asserted, that even though there were no
precedent, this fact should not be fatal to the power of a court
of equity to grant relief in such a case. Present day laws are
not infallible. It is only through criticism and change that
flaws in existing things are pointed out and corrected, and
progress is furthered. Clinging to precedent is natural, and is
often a safeguard against untried and dangerous doctrines
which would tend to overthrow all established order. Nevertheless, as painful and fearsome as the operation may appear to be,
the human race is compelled from time to time, in response to
the irresistible forces of progress, to cast off old and impeding
doctrines, and adopt new ones, better suited to meet the requirements of an advanced order of things. The historical development of our law is a record of such processes. The rejection of the old rule, as to the adequacy of the legal remedy,
would be only another forward step.
There does not seem to be any limitation to place on this
doctrine when applied in tort cases, because the rights of third
parties would not be infringed, and equity could in all cases
grant relief where the defendant was insolvent. But, if the
contract is of such a character that the rights and interests of
third persons would be affected by granting specific performance against an insolvent defendant, equity should decline to
take jurisdiction.
Therefore, in all those cases in which equity can grant relief without injuring third persons, equity should do so, if the
courts are to be instruments through which justice is to be rendered, rather than bodies bound by harsh technicalities, thereby defeating the purpose for which they were created.
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